First Case of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax in the United States, Palm Beach County, Florida, 2001 by Traeger, Marc S. et al.
Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1029
BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
First Case of Bioterrorism-
Related Inhalational 
Anthrax in the United States, 
Palm Beach County, 
Florida, 2001
Marc S. Traeger,*† Steven T. Wiersma,† Nancy E. Rosenstein,* Jean M. Malecki‡, 
Colin W. Shepard,* Pratima L. Raghunathan,* Segaran P. Pillai,§ Tanja Popovic,* 
Conrad P. Quinn,* Richard F. Meyer,* Sharif R. Zaki,* Savita Kumar,‡ Sherrie M. Bruce,* 
James J. Sejvar,* Peter M. Dull,* Bruce C. Tierney,* Joshua D. Jones,* 
Bradley A. Perkins,* and the Florida Investigation Team1 
On October 4, 2001, we confirmed the first bioterrorism-related anthrax case identified in the United States
in a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. Epidemiologic investigation indicated that exposure occurred
at the workplace through intentionally contaminated mail. One additional case of inhalational anthrax was
identified from the index patient’s workplace. Among 1,076 nasal cultures performed to assess exposure,
Bacillus anthracis was isolated from a co-worker later confirmed as being infected, as well as from an
asymptomatic mail-handler in the same workplace. Environmental cultures for B. anthracis showed con-
tamination at the workplace and six county postal facilities. Environmental and nasal swab cultures were
useful epidemiologic tools that helped direct the investigation towards the infection source and transmis-
sion vehicle. We identified 1,114 persons at risk and offered antimicrobial prophylaxis. 
n Florida, human anthrax has been rare; among eight
human cases reported in Florida in the 20th century, the
most recent was a cutaneous case in 1974 (1). On October 2,
2001, a 63-year-old Florida man was hospitalized for a nonlo-
calizing severe illness that began 2 days earlier, characterized
by fever, chills, sweats, fatigue, and malaise, which progressed
to vomiting, confusion, and incoherent speech. No history of
cough, dyspnea, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or skin lesions was
reported. On October 4, the Florida Department of Health
(FDOH) Bureau of Laboratories confirmed B. anthracis from a
culture of cerebrospinal fluid. The patient’s condition deterio-
rated, and he died 3 days after admission (2).
After anthrax was confirmed and in consideration of possi-
ble bioterrorism, we initiated an investigation to determine the
extent and source of the event, develop control strategies, and
protect potentially exposed persons. This report summarizes
the findings of our epidemiologic investigation.
Methods
Case Investigation
We performed a detailed investigation of the index
patient’s exposures during the 60 days before his illness. We
visually inspected and obtained culture specimens for Bacillus
anthracis at locations he visited during the 60-day period,
including his home, recreational destinations, retail outlets
patronized, and workplace. Initial samples from the workplace
were from the patient’s work area and the company mailroom
and photo library, as well as air ventilation filters. 
Case-Finding and Surveillance
A confirmed case of anthrax was defined as a clinically
compatible cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness
confirmed as anthrax by laboratory tests, including 1) isolation
of B. anthracis from an affected tissue or site or 2) other labora-
tory evidence of B. anthracis infection based on at least two
supportive laboratory tests (3). Supportive laboratory tests
included polymerase chain reaction (PCR) (4) of DNA from
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patient fluid from a normally sterile site, immunohistochemical
staining of patient tissue samples, and enzyme-linked immun-
osorbent assay serologic tests to detect immunoglobulin G
(IgG) response to B. anthracis protective antigen (PA) (5).
 We implemented case-finding through daily chart review
in Palm Beach County intensive-care units (ICUs) and region-
ally in ICUs in North Carolina, where the index patient had
traveled during the potential exposure period. ICU patients
who had blood or cerebrospinal fluid cultures performed
within 24 hours of hospital admission had more detailed chart
reviews and interviews. If anthrax was not ruled out, further
interviews were done with patients, family members, and med-
ical providers. Laboratory testing for B. anthracis and other
potentially causative pathogens was offered if indicated.
Nearby counties implemented similar case-finding efforts in
ICUs and emergency departments.
We initiated enhanced surveillance locally through alerts
to medical examiners and statewide through requests to labo-
ratory directors to forward to the FDOH laboratories any cul-
tures suspicious for Bacillus species isolated from sterile sites.
A statewide veterinary alert was issued for cases of anthrax in
animals. All case-finding surveillance was retrospective to
September 11, 2001, and prospective beginning October 5.
Surveillance in Potentially Exposed Groups
Workplace-exposed persons were defined as those who,
within 60 days of onset of illness in the index patient, spent >1
h in the building where he worked. On October 3 through the
employer, on October 8 through press releases and media
briefings, and on October 8–10,13, 17, and 19 through infor-
mation bulletins, we asked workplace-exposed persons and
medical personnel caring for them to report influenzalike ill-
ness or skin lesions to the FDOH. Beginning October 8, hospi-
tals were notified through infection-control professionals and
public health alerts. 
We obtained nasal swabs from workplace-exposed persons
while dispensing prophylactic antibiotics on October 8–10 and
from workers who handled trash at the workplace on October
13. Immediately after specimens were obtained, nasal swabs
were applied to sheep-blood agar culture medium plates and
transported to the Florida Public Health Laboratory. B. anthra-
cis was confirmed in nonmotile, nonhemolytic isolates by
gamma-phage lysis and PCR and later by detection of B.
anthracis capsule and cell-wall antigens with direct fluores-
cent antibody tests. Testing for serum IgG antibody response
to the PA component of the anthrax toxins was offered on
October 10, 13, 17, and 19 to workplace-exposed persons.
We conducted interviews to investigate contaminated mail
as an anthrax transmission vehicle at the workplace and to esti-
mate incubation periods among anthrax patients. Persons who
reported seeing or handling mail perceived as unusual or sus-
picious and persons with suspected anthrax exposure based on
nasal swab cultures or preliminary serologic test results were
interviewed to describe details surrounding unusual mail inci-
dents as well as their routine exposure to the mail. 
On October 12, we obtained nasal swabs from postal
workers most likely to have handled contaminated mail at two
county postal facilities that supplied mail to the workplace. We
initiated anthrax surveillance on October 25 among postal
employees in Palm Beach County through postal worker ill-
ness reports, a toll-free hotline for postal employees, and hos-
pital infection-control professional reports of postal worker
hospitalizations in Palm Beach County.
Environmental Investigation
We collected bulk objects (e.g., filters from heating, venti-
lation, and air conditioning [HVAC] units, mail, soil samples)
and swab, wipe, vacuum, and air specimens to test for B.
anthracis environmental contamination by standard collection
and shipping techniques (6). Control samples were routinely
performed.
After contamination was confirmed at the workplace, we
performed focused environmental sampling on October 8–10.
Samples were obtained at work areas of the index patient and
persons identified with potential B. anthracis exposures
through nasal swab cultures, preliminary serologic test results,
and interviews. Samples were also obtained from trash recep-
tacles, items removed from the building, and the company
mail van. Subsequent sampling throughout the 68,000 square-
foot, three-story building was performed on October 25–
November 8, 2001, to characterize the extent of contamination
in the workplace. Samples were obtained from all floors, the
parking garage, and the roof.
Beginning on October 12, 2001, we obtained surface sam-
ples for cultures at Palm Beach County postal facilities that
processed workplace mail. We obtained samples from mail
facilities sequentially, in reverse order of a route the mail most
likely followed to arrive at the workplace. Facilities from
postal routes serving two workplace buildings were tested.
One route included three postal facilities that process >99% of
mail the workplace received, and another route included four
other postal facilities that might process workplace mail if the
mail had been sent to a previous office, vacated by the com-
pany 13 months earlier. We sampled areas in each facility
where workplace mail was most likely to have been processed.
Selected environmental and clinical specimen isolates of B.
anthracis were analyzed by determining base-pair sequences in
designated portions of isolate DNA to characterize subtypes,
and sequences were then compared. Base sequence analysis
was performed by multiple-locus variable-number of tandem
repeat typing analysis (MLVA) techniques (7). 
Prophylaxis and Control Measures
We offered prophylactic antibiotics for B. anthracis to work-
place-exposed persons (8). Until the risk for Florida postal
workers could be assessed, we initiated prophylaxis for selected
postal workers most likely to have handled workplace mail at
two local postal facilities. Subsequent adjunct vaccination was




An autopsy of the index patient supported the diagnosis of
inhalational anthrax. Autopsy findings included markedly
enlarged hemorrhagic mediastinal lymph nodes on gross
examination and laboratory detection of B. anthracis by
immunohistochemical tests in mediastinal lymph nodes,
spleen, liver sinusoids, and phagocytic cells.
The patient had no reported exposure typically associated
with naturally occurring anthrax, including exposure to ani-
mals or animal products potentially harboring B. anthracis
spores. He worked as a photo editor for a national media com-
pany that produces tabloid newspapers and other publications.
He bicycled and fished for recreation, and his only travel in the
60 days before symptom onset on September 30 was a 5-day
automobile trip to North Carolina. No typical naturally occur-
ring anthrax sources were seen at any location inspected, and
no B. anthracis contamination was detected among 44 samples
from nonworkplace specimens. B. anthracis was identified in
2 of 12 specimens obtained on October 5: from the index
patient’s computer keyboard and his mailbox in the company
mailroom. 
Workplace interviews regarding mail exposure showed
that the index patient rarely handled or opened workplace
mail, but co-workers recalled that he had examined a piece of
stationery containing a fine, white, talc-like powder on Sep-
tember 19. The patient was observed holding the stationery
close to his face as he looked at it over his computer keyboard.
Case-Finding and Surveillance
No anthrax cases were detected in Palm Beach County
ICU patients, although six patients underwent extensive fol-
low-up from >500 medical charts reviewed through October
31, 2001. No anthrax cases were reported through surveillance
by medical examiners. An autopsy was performed to rule out
anthrax in one case reported through surveillance of medical
examiners and Palm Beach County ICUs, and the patient was
determined not to have anthrax. Through 2001, FDOH labora-
tories reported no B. anthracis isolations among 293 clinical
isolates received to rule out anthrax. No reports of veterinary
anthrax were received through the Florida Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services. No anthrax cases were
reported through nearby county case-finding efforts among
persons not exposed in the workplace.
Surveillance among Potentially Exposed Groups
Among six workplace-exposed persons who were exten-
sively evaluated after medical providers reported their illness,
one was also identified among Palm Beach ICU patients, and
inhalational anthrax was confirmed in another, a Miami-Dade
County resident. This second case-patient was a 73-year-old
mail distributor and co-worker of the index patient, who was
reported by his medical provider on October 4. His illness
began on September 28, and he was admitted to a hospital in
Miami-Dade County on October 1, 2001. A nasal swab culture
obtained on October 5 showed B. anthracis, but cultures from
blood, bronchial washings, and pleural fluid, obtained after
initiation of antibiotics, were negative. Two specimens of
pleural fluid obtained on October 5 and 12 were tested by PCR
and were positive for B. anthracis. Immunohistochemical
staining of B. anthracis capsule and cell-wall antigens from
pleural fluid cytology preparations and from transbronchial
and pleural biopsy tissues obtained on October 5 and 12 were
positive. Serial serum samples, obtained on October 7, 10, 11,
and 17, indicated a serum IgG antibody response to the PA
component of the anthrax toxin consistent with acute B.
anthracis infection. The patient was treated with antibiotics
and was discharged from the hospital on October 17 (10).
Of 1,076 nasal cultures obtained from workplace-exposed
persons, two yielded B. anthracis. The first was the second
case-patient, and the second was from an asymptomatic mail
sorter in the same workplace. Nasal swab cultures obtained
from two workers that handled workplace trash did not yield
B. anthracis.
Interviews with employees regarding suspicious mail
showed that the two workplace-exposed persons with nasal
cultures positive for B. anthracis had extensive mail exposure.
One, the second case-patient, was the workplace mail distribu-
tor; he did not generally open mail and did not recall handling
or seeing any mail containing powder or described as unusual
or as hate mail. He picked up 10,000–15,000 pieces of mail
from the post office each weekday in the company mail van
and distributed it at the workplace. The other co-worker, a 36-
year-old woman, sorted mail and opened mail addressed to a
periodical different from the one to which the index patient
contributed. She recalled opening an envelope that released
powder in her office on or about September 25. Afterwards,
she discarded it in the trash without reading it. The letter most
likely had arrived during the previous 2 weeks while she was
on vacation. No other workplace mail likely to contain B.
anthracis was suggested through further interviews. 
Workplace information about exposure to suspicious mail
indicated that the incubation period for both Florida case-
patients was <12 days (Figure 1). The index patient had onset
Figure 1. Dates of onset of symptoms of inhalational anthrax cases in
Florida, and timeline of related events, September 16–October 16,
2001.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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of illness 11 days after handling suspicious mail on September
19. The second case-patient had illness onset September 28, 9
days after the index-patient viewed suspicious mail on Sep-
tember 19 and 3 days after his co-worker opened a letter with
powder in it on September 25.
Serial or paired serum tests for IgG antibody response to
the PA component of the anthrax toxins were performed on
serum of 436 workplace-exposed persons. No serum indicated
a reaction consistent with acute B. anthracis infection except
for that of the second case-patient. For most of the serologic
tests, specimens were collected on October 10 and 17. 
Among 32 postal workers who potentially handled work-
place mail at two county postal facilities, 31 nasal cultures
were obtained; none yielded B. anthracis. No anthrax cases
were detected among 3,263 postal workers working at the 51
Palm Beach County postal facilities through the county postal
worker surveillance system, which reported 226 illnesses and
7 hospitalizations during October 25–November 9, 2001.
Environmental Investigation
Of 136 investigation-directed environmental samples
obtained during October 8–10 from the workplace and com-
pany mail van, 20 were positive, including 10 of 20 from the
mailroom, 1 of 2 from the company mail van, 5 of 6 from the
office of the asymptomatic mail-sorter who had a positive
nasal culture and had opened a letter containing powder, 2 of
21 from the index patient’s work area (at an incoming-mail
desk near his workspace and a repeat sample from his com-
puter keyboard), 1 of 9 in the text library, and 1 from the single
basement ventilation filter sample. No B. anthracis contamina-
tion was detected from 8 trash receptacles or 2 roof ventilation
filters, 28 bulk items removed from the building containing
security camera information, 18 samples from a construction
area, or 21 other samples from other work areas and the
entrance lobby. Five samples from the third-floor HVAC ducts
(three from the index patient’s office and one from another
office), and three samples from the first floor HVAC ducts
(from the mailroom, an office where an envelope with powder
was opened, and the text library) were negative.
Eighty-four of 460 workplace samples obtained during
October 25–November 8 yielded B. anthracis (Figure 2). Iso-
lates of B. anthracis were obtained from 66 of 247, 10 of 95,
and 8 of 112 samples from the first, second, and third floors,
respectively; none of 6 specimens were positive from the park-
ing garage or roof vents. The northeast quadrant of the third
floor, which contained executive office suites, a conference
room, and storage areas, was the only quadrant of any floor
without detected contamination. The index-patient’s office
was located on the third floor of the building. The mailroom
(the work area of the second case-patient) and the office near
the mailroom where a powder-containing letter was opened
are both on the first floor.
No mail containing B. anthracis spores was recovered.
Because workplace refuse is incinerated and waste receptacles
did not show contamination, no environmental specimens
were obtained from waste sites.
B. anthracis contamination was detected at six of seven
postal facilities tested, from routes serving the current work-
place headquarters and a former office. Contamination was not
detected at a facility that receives mail addressed to the post
office box of the former workplace office, last used 13 months
earlier.
Molecular subtyping analysis (MLVA) was performed on
one B. anthracis isolate recovered from a postal facility that
processed workplace mail, 18 isolates recovered from the
workplace, cerebrospinal fluid and blood culture isolates from
the index patient, and two nasal swab isolates from workplace-
exposed persons. All B. anthracis isolates tested were indistin-
guishable by MLVA.
Prophylaxis and Control Measures
Beginning October 8, we recommended 60-day antibiotic
postexposure prophylaxis (2) to 1,114 workplace-exposed per-
sons identified through employers and responses to public ser-
vice announcements. We provided medication refills on
October 17–19 and November 1 at a workplace branch office
and as needed through the Palm Beach County Health Depart-
ment. Beginning October 24, we attempted telephone contact
Figure 2. Environmental sample locations of specimens tested for Bacillus anthracis obtained October 25–November 8, 2001, on the three floors of
the media company building where patients were employed, Palm Beach County, Florida. Sample locations of 59 negative specimens (including 46
air samples) are not depicted.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1033
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with persons who did not refill medications and advised them
about our recommendations and how to obtain medications.
Adjunct anthrax vaccination, available beginning December
22, was accepted by three workplace-exposed persons.
When the postal system risk assessment was initiated on
October 12, antibiotic prophylaxis was offered to 32 postal
workers who were most likely to have handled workplace mail
at two local postal facilities. After we determined that at least
24 days had passed since contamination most likely took place
in postal facilities, we did not recommend prophylactic antibi-
otics to Florida postal workers since more than two of the typ-
ical 1- to 7-day incubation periods for inhalational anthrax had
passed, or two of the up to 12-day incubation periods esti-
mated for the two Florida cases. 
Discussion
This report describes the investigation of the first bioter-
rorism-related anthrax case identified in the United States. We
detected two inhalational anthrax cases (including the index
case) among workers of a Florida media company. Anthrax
transmission and widespread environmental contamination
throughout the workplace and in six local postal facilities most
likely resulted from two letters containing B. anthracis spores
delivered to the workplace.
The index patient’s infection most likely occurred from
inhalation of B. anthracis spores following a primary aero-
solization, i.e., spores released into the air after opening a
spore-containing letter. This scenario is consistent with co-
workers’ recollections that the index patient held a letter con-
taining powder over his computer keyboard, as well as envi-
ronmental samples showing contamination at his keyboard, an
incoming-mail desk near his workspace, and his mailroom
mailbox. The second case-patient did not recall opening or
seeing a letter containing powder, and the mechanism of spore
aerosolization resulting in his infection is unclear. He was
likely exposed while delivering 10,000–15,000 mail pieces
daily to the workplace mailroom; both the mailroom and mail
van were contaminated with B. anthracis spores. He may have
inhaled spores after mail was compressed or shaken during
delivery or after he (unknowingly) or a co-worker opened a
spore-containing envelope. A secondary aerosolization, i.e.,
spores resuspended in the air after settling to a surface follow-
ing an initial release, may also have resulted in his infection.
Results from environmental specimens and nasal swab cul-
tures helped guide the investigation and were especially useful
when combined as epidemiologic tools. The first environmen-
tal sample yielding B. anthracis, from the index patient’s work
area, when paired with the first positive nasal swab culture,
which was obtained from the second case-patient, indicated
that the exposure source was at the workplace. Evidence that
mail was the transmission vehicle was provided through two
nasal swab cultures yielding B. anthracis from workplace mail
handlers (one who recalled opening a letter containing pow-
der) and results of environmental specimen cultures, revealing
contamination in the workplace mail van and mail room. The
usefulness of nasal swab cultures may have been limited by
the interval of >13 days between the primary aerosolized spore
exposures (letters opened on or about September 19 and 25)
and the date nasal cultures were obtained (most on October 8).
A high yield from nasal cultures would not be expected after
>7 days had elapsed. One study showed that only one of eight
nasal cultures from rhesus monkeys exposed to aerosolized B.
anthracis spores yielded B. anthracis 7 days later (11). Envi-
ronmental sampling was valuable independently in areas
where no contamination was detected, by directing the investi-
gation away from uncontaminated areas. 
Environmental sampling revealed widespread contamina-
tion. However, the number or percentage of positive samples
in a given area could not be used to quantify the contamination
because quantitative spore counts were not performed when
samples were cultured, a variety of sampling techniques were
used (swabs, wipes, vacuum, and air sampling), and the distri-
bution of samples obtained was not uniform.
This report documents the public health investigation into
the first recognized case of anthrax due to intentional dissemi-
nation of B. anthracis spores in the United States. We demon-
strated the usefulness of nasal swab cultures when combined
with environmental specimen and epidemiologic data to iden-
tify the exposure site and vehicle used for anthrax transmis-
sion. Public health workers and clinicians should remain
vigilant for anthrax because of the continued threat of
bioterrorism.
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